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III. ARGUMENT 
A. NONE OF JUDGE BURNINGHAM'S RULINGS AUTHORIZED THE 
HAMILTONS TO TAKE MORE SHARES OF HAMILTON BROTHERS 
ELECTRIC, INC. STOCK THAN AMBER MCKELVEY RECEIVED. 
The first issue is whether the District Court erred when it ruled that Judge 
Burningham's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("FFCL") and Order Denying 
Petition to Remove the Personal Representatives and Granting Interim Distribution 
("Order") in the Matter of the Estate of Gordon Dean Hamilton ("Gordon Hamilton 
Matter") authorized Stuart G. Hamilton ("Stuart") and Vincent Hamilton ("Vincent"), 
(collectively "Hamiltons") to take, in addition to their other distributions from the Estate, 
8,317 shares of Hamilton Brothers Electric, Inc. ("HBE") stock. In her opening brief to 
this Court, Amber McKelvey ("Amber") demonstrated that the District Court's 
interpretation of the FFCL and the Order conflicted with the portions of those rulings 
quantifying the Estate's assets and liabilities, the distributions to Amber and her two 
sisters, Lisa Kunz ("Lisa") and Tonua Hamilton ("Tonua"), and the per share value of 
HBE stock. If there is any merit to the District Court's interpretation, which Amber 
disputes, then the FFCL and the Order are ambiguous and, under Utah law, ambiguities 
in court orders are construed against their drafters which, in this case, are the Hamiltons. 
Culbertson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, % 15, 44 P.3d 642. 
The Hamiltons admit that the FFCL and the Order accurately established the 
Estate's total assets and liabilities, the prior distributions to all five heirs and the 
distributions to the three sisters, and the value of HBE's stock. (Hamiltons' Brf. at 1-2, 
9-10, 23-25.) The error in the District Court's ruling follows as a mathematical certainty. 
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"All other property of the Estate" available to the Hamiltons1 equated to the "Total Gross 
Estate" of $1,957,242; minus the "Total Expenses and Reserves" of $1,065,577; minus 
$267,460 of "[i]nsurance proceeds," "[household goods" and "[c]ash" previously 
distributed in equal shares to all five heirs; and minus the $424,524 to be distributed to 
the three sisters, $141,508 to each. That subtraction equals $199,681 in Estate assets for 
the Hamiltons, or $99,840.50 each.2 (R. at 918, 1252-56; Hamiltons' Brf. at 1-2, 9-10 
and n.2, 25.) At $84.10 per share—the stock value that the Hamiltons admit was set in 
the FFCL—the Hamiltons' $99,840.50 distributions could yield no more than 1,187.16 
shares of HBE stock ($99,840.50 - $84.10/share = 1,187.16 shares). (Id at 10, 23; R. at 
1058.) Hence, there is no way the FFCL and the Order could have authorized the 
Hamiltons to take 8,317 shares of HBE stock—worth $699,459.70—in addition to the 
other assets they took as distributions, unless one disregards the FFCL and the Order's 
accounting of the Estate's assets and liabilities, the prior distributions to all five heirs and 
the distributions to the three sisters, or the $84.10/share value.3 
1
 R. at 863. 
In their Brief, the Hamiltons assert that "the net disposition to the Hamilton 
brothers was $306,665 for both of them," or $153,332 each. (Hamiltons' Brf. at 14, 25.) 
The difference between the $306,665 and the $199,681 figures is the $106,984 in 
"[ijnsurance proceeds," "[h]ousehold goods," and "[c]ash" that the Hamiltons admittedly 
received - $53,492 apiece - prior to the FFCL and the Order. (Id at 9-10; R. at 1054, 
1255.) Thus, the parties agree, as the Hamiltons admitted to both the District Court and 
Judge Burningham, that under the FFCL and the Order, the Hamiltons could receive only 
$199,681 in Estate assets, or $99,840.50 each. (R. at 918, 1302.) 
As for the $134,540 personal representatives fee the Hamiltons shared, which 
they claim to have used to purchase HBE shares from the Estate (Hamiltons' Brf. at 2, 
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The Hamiltons implicitly identify which of these three they believe this Court 
should disregard: the $84.10/share value. The Hamiltons concede the effect of the 
FFCL's and the Order's accounting and distributions. (R. at 1302; Hamiltons' Brf. at 1-
2, 14, 24-25.) Indeed, they argue at length that they received no "windfall" because, as a 
i i 
result of such accounting and distributions, their total distributions amounted to only 
$306,665, which includes the $106,984 in "[insurance proceeds," "[household goods," 
and "[c]ash" they previously received. (Hamiltons' Brf. at 14, 25.) That left, at most, 
$199,681, or $99,840.50 each, for HBE stock. (R. at 918, 1302.) Even after 
acknowledging all this, the Hamiltons nevertheless argue that the residual, "[a]ll other 
property of the Estate" distribution to them included 8317 HBE shares. (Hamiltons' Brf. 
at 12-13, 18, 20.) For that to be true, the value of HBE stock could not have been 
$84.10/share, the value set by the FFCL, as the Hamiltons concede. (Id at 10, 23; R. at 
1058.) Instead, the stock value would have had to be, at most, $24.01/share ($199,681 -*-
8,317 shares = $24.01/share).4 Of course, if that were the per share value, Amber's 
$141,508 distribution would have yielded 5,893.7 shares ($141,508 - $24.01/share = 
5,893.7 shares), rather than the 1,683 shares she received. 
13), the Hamiltons do not dispute that the stock transfer restrictions of HBE's Bylaws 
render such alleged purchase null and void. (Amber's Brf. at 16.) 
4
 For the Hamiltons to receive 8,317 HBE shares with their $199,681 distribution, 
the per share value would actually have had to be even lower than $24.01/share because 
the Hamiltons did not use their entire $199,681 residual distribution solely for HBE 
stock. They also took an $85,000 commercial lot that Judge Burningham ordered them to 
sell. (R. at 866-67, 870, 971, 998-99, 1010, 1050-51.) 
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The error of the District Court's adoption of the Hamiltons' defense of 
authorization to take 8,317 shares could not be more clear. Nevertheless, the Hamiltons 
point to portions of the FFCL and the Order, which, they contend, support their receipt of 
8,317 HBE shares. In addition, they argue that Amber is precluded from demonstrating 
that any ambiguity in the FFCL should be construed against them. None of the 
Hamiltons' arguments have any merit. 
1. The Portions Of The FFCL And The Order On Which The Hamiltons 
Rely Did Not Authorize The Hamiltons5 Receipt Of 8,317 HBE Shares. 
Contending that the "plain language" of the FFCL and the Order supports the 
Hamiltons' receipt of 8,317 HBE shares, the Hamiltons point to the residual, "[a]ll other 
property of the Estate" distribution to them. (Hamiltons' Brf. at 11-12, 20.) The 
Hamiltons concede, however, that "[a]ll other property of the Estate" was limited to 
$199,681, or $99,840.50 each, and $199,681 in HBE stock at the $84.10/share price 
established in the FFCL yields nowhere near the 8,317 shares they claim. (Id at 13-14, 
24-25.) Thus, the residual distribution to the Hamiltons set forth in the FFCL and the 
Order does not help them explain how they received that much stock. 
Apparently recognizing that fact, the Hamiltons seize on other portions of the 
FFCL and the Order, but at every turn the Hamiltons are blocked by the FFCL and the 
Order's accounting of the Estate's assets and expenses, the distributions to the three 
sisters, and the $84.10 per share price of HBE stock. The Hamiltons argue that the FFCL 
and the Order imposed responsibility on them to satisfy the Estate's expenses and 
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provided them with the "balance of the estate" "[a]part from the $195,000 paid to 
[Amber] and each of the two sisters." (Hamiltons' Brf. at 25.) 
The Hamiltons' argument conflicts with the FFCL and the Order. Under those 
rulings, the Hamiltons were not authorized to receive "the balance of the estate" after 
deducting only the distributions to the three sisters. The Hamiltons' authorized 
distribution of "[a]ll other property of the Estate" equated to the Estate's assets after 
deductions for not only the three sisters' distributions, but also for the Estate's "Total 
Expenses and Reserves" (including the life estate in the "House, Lots 20 and 21" for 
Gordon Hamiltons' widow) and a $170,000 property reserved for HBE. (R. at 844, 863-
65,870-71,969-70.) 
The only way the Hamiltons' receipt of "[a]ll other property of the Estate" could 
have enabled them to take 8,317 HBE shares, at $84.10/share, is if the value of the 
Estate's assets exceeded the values set forth in the FFCL, or if the Estate's liabilities were 
less than quantified by the FFCL. For example, if the Estate's total assets greatly 
appreciated in value, or if the Estate's liabilities lessened, between January 21, 1994 
(when the FFCL and the Order were entered (R. at 1249, 1272)) and February 20, 1994 
(when the Hamiltons claim to have received their 8,317 shares (R. at 726-27, 739-40)) 
that might explain how the Hamiltons could take $699,459.70 of HBE stock and still 
satisfy the Estate's expenses and the three sisters' distributions. But there is no evidence 
that the Estate's assets appreciated in value, or that the Estate's liabilities lessened, in 
such a short time period. In fact, the Hamiltons repeatedly argue that they ended up with 
only $306,665 in Estate assets, which negates the notion that their distributions grew as a 
5 
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result of asset appreciation or liability reduction. (Hamiltons' Brf. at 14, 25; R. at 918, 
1302.) 
Moreover, the Hamiltons offered an explanation, under oath, as to how they 
acquired their HBE shares, and their explanation does not include an appreciation of 
Estate assets or reduction of Estate liabilities: 
Q. Explain to me, then, how it is that you came away with 4,158 . . . shares 
of Hamilton Brothers Electric stock, and Amber with 1,683 shares? 
A. To my knowledge, I think I've already answered that. 
MR. MORRIS: Give it another shot. 
THE WITNESS: The executor fees, which was 134 - I'm not sure the 
exact amount, 134 - this was done in January of '94, so it's been a while. 
The fact that me and Stuart purchased Lisa and Tonua's [distributions], we 
didn't take their share away, we purchased it from them [using Estate 
properties to pay the purchase price]. And with that purchase, we bought 
stock. And with the amount that we received originally, the 141,508 that 
we received in stock, add those three items, the executor's fee, the payoff of 
Lisa and Tonua for their [distributions], and the original amount that we 
received, that's where the 4,158.50 came from, I believe. 
(R. at 1055; see also R. at 1056-58.) While Amber disputes that the Hamiltons could 
have acquired their HBE stock in this manner, the parties agree that the Hamiltons did not 
acquire their stock through an increase in value of Estate assets or a reduction of Estate 
liabilities. 
Unable to identify any portion of the FFCL and the Order that authorized the 
Hamiltons to take more HBE shares than Amber received, the Hamiltons rely on portions 
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of the FFCL, from which they argue they deserved more shares than Amber. (Hamiltons' 
Brf. at 24-26 and n.14.) None of that, however, changes the FFCL and the Order's 
accounting of the Estate's assets and liabilities, distributions to the three sisters, and 
$84.10/share value of HBE stock, which render mathematically impossible the notion 
that the FFCL and the Order authorized the Hamiltons to take $699,459.70 in HBE stock, 
in addition to their $106,984 prior distribution and the $85,000 "commercial lot" that was 
to be sold for Lisa and Tonua. (R. at 866-67, 870, 971, 998-99, 1010, 1050-51.) 
Moreover, none of the portions on which the Hamiltons rely are inconsistent with 
the Hamiltons' receipt of the same amount of, or less, shares than Amber received. For 
example, nothing about the idea that the Hamiltons "were plainly intended to be in 
charge" of HBE is inconsistent with each of them having the same amount, or less, HBE 
stock than Amber, which, when aggregated, puts them in the majority. (Hamiltons' Brf. 
at 24 n. 14.) 
2. Amber Expressly Preserved Her Argument That, If There Is Any 
Merit To The Hamiltons' Interpretation Of The FFCL And The 
Order, Then Those Rulings Are Ambiguous, And The Ambiguity Must 
Be Construed Against The Hamiltons. 
The Hamiltons do not dispute the rule that ambiguities in court orders must be 
construed against their drafters. Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, ^  15, 44 P.3d 642. Nor do 
they dispute that they drafted the FFCL and the Order, so any ambiguity therein should 
be construed against them. Instead, the Hamiltons argue that Amber failed to preserve 
her ambiguity argument by disclaiming it to the District Court. The Hamiltons could not 
be any more wrong. 
#250002 vl sic 
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The seminal Utah case regarding preservation of issues for appeal and invited 
errors is Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 164 P.3d 366. Because the invited error doctrine's 
purpose is to c"discourag[e] parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to 
preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal,'"5 the Court limited the invited error 
doctrine to situations in which an issue is disclaimed 
in a more affirmative manner, such as where counsel stipulates to the 
court's instruction, states directly that there is no objection to a specific 
ruling of the court, or provides the court with erroneous authority upon 
which the court relies. 
Id. T| 23. In contrast, an issue is preserved for appeal if, in the district court, it is "raised 
in a timely fashion," "specifically," and with "supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority." Id, ^ 15 (internal quotations omitted). 
Here, Amber specifically preserved her ambiguity argument by timely and 
specifically raising it, along with relevant legal authority, during oral argument on the 
Hamiltons' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. at 1923 pp. 31-33, 39-40, 47-48, 
51-52,65.) 
Now, up until today and including today the defendants have shifted 
wildly in terms of how they explain Judge Burningham authorized them to 
receive more shares than Amber did. 
The reason I point all that out, Your Honor, and the reason why Tab-
1 in this benchbook is Culbertson versus Board of County Commissioners 
of Salt Lake County is that all of that gives rise to a lot of ambiguity in 
what Judge Burningham did. 
5
 Id U 17 (quoting State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^ 15, 128 P.3d 1171). 
8 
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(R. at 1923, pp. 31-32 (emphasis added).) After describing the Culbertson case, Amber's 
counsel argued that, if the Hamiltons' interpretation had any merit, the FFCL and the 
Order were ambiguous: 
In this case the defendants, the Hamilton brothers were the 
prevailing parties, so they say. They clearly drafted [the FFCL and Order]. 
Ambiguities should therefore be construed against them. 
This, the order of Judge Burningham has ambiguity in spades, at 
least according to their interpretation. 
(R. at 1923, p. 33.) The District Court clearly understood Amber's argument: 
THE JUDGE: But is that the, is that the ambiguity in the order really is 
that we really, it seems to me that Judge Burningham was talking about two 
things, we were talking about value of stock and we're never really talking 
about shares of stock. And, and that's a problem. 
MR. HOGLE: Well, I agree with you it's a problem. He's, he's talking, he 
translates everything into dollar amounts and then he translates it back from 
dollar amounts into shares of stock [only in connection with Amber's 
distribution] because Amber opted to get everything she could in company 
stock. That's the problem, that's the problem if there is a problem with 
these findings. 
(R. at 1923, pp. 39-40.) Indeed, the District Court ruled on Amber's argument when it 
held that the FFCL and the Order were clear and did not support Amber's interpretation: 
The Court has carefully parsed the findings, conclusions, and order issued 
in January 1994. Having done so, the Court concludes that the . . . 
distribution of [8,317 HBE shares to the Hamiltons] was consistent with the 
order of interim distribution. Nothing in Judge Burningham's findings, 
conclusions, or order prevented the Hamiltons from acquiring a larger 
percentage of HBE stock than McKelvey. Distribution to the Hamiltons "in 
kind" - whether for personal representative fees or as part of the residual 
estate - was expressly permitted. 
(R. at 1380.) 
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The Hamiltons focus on Amber's arguments that their interpretation did not have 
any merit, so the District Court need not find any ambiguity. (R. at 1923, pp. 36-37.) 
That is a far cry from disclaiming an argument that the FFCL and the Order are 
ambiguous. 
Even if Amber had not argued the ambiguity of the FFCL and the Order, but 
asserted only that those ruling were unambiguous, this Court could still find the FFCL 
and the Order to be ambiguous and construe them accordingly. Utah courts have found 
legal instruments to be ambiguous in cases where all parties argued they were clear. E.g., 
Deep Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State Armory Bd., 2008 UT 3, ffif 12, 15, 178 P.3d 886 
(both sides argued that the contract language was "unambiguous" and "clearly" supported 
its interpretation and negated the other's, yet the court held that the contract "is 
ambiguous on its face, and the lower court erred in ruling that the term is unambiguous"); 
Utah Public Employees Ass'n v. State, 2006 UT 9, Iffl 30-31, 131 P.3d 208 (same, except 
legal instrument was a statute). 
The Hamiltons also argue that Amber waived her ambiguity argument when her 
counsel "stressed . . . that the district court should interpret the 1994 FFCL as a matter of 
law." (Hamiltons' Brf. at 21.) The argument that the FFCL and the Order should be 
interpreted as a matter of law and the argument that those rulings are ambiguous, 
however, are absolutely consistent assertions, as Amber's counsel explained to the 
District Court: 
MR. HOGLE: . . . But Culbertson says if it's ambiguous they lose because 
you construe, you construe any ambiguities in the order against the 
prevailing parties who drafted it. . . . 
10 
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THE JUDGE: I guess my question is did Culbertson go back to trial? Did 
he have to go back to trial or did the Court simply adopt the a, 
interpretation of the non-drafting party? 
MR. HOGLE: You do not submit an order to a fact-finder. It's not done. 
And here's why. Culbertson addressed this in paragraph 15. 
We construe an ambiguous order under the rules that apply to 
other legal documents. . . . Where construction is called for 
it is the duty of the Court to interpret an ambiguity. . . . 
You don't submit it a fact-finder. . . . The judge construes it. 
(R. at 1923, pp. 47-48 (emphasis added) (quoting Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, H 15, 44 P.3d 
462).) Unlike contracts, in which ambiguity generally precludes interpretation as a 
matter of law, court orders must always be interpreted as a matter of law, even in cases of 
ambiguity. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF A 
PARTIAL, ORAL, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND, ON THAT BASIS, 
DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE ALL OF AMBER'S CLAIMS, EXCEPT 
HER CLAIM TO BE DECLARED 1/3 OWNER OF HBE. 
The Hamiltons do not dispute that they bore the burden of proving, with 
admissible evidence, the existence of the alleged oral, partial, settlement agreement. 
Instead, the Hamiltons contend that they satisfied their burden with: (1) their attorneys' 
February 24, 2006 letter to Amber's attorney, Benson Hathaway (R. at 1536-37); (2) the 
fact that Mr. Hathaway did not deny an agreement in response; (3) a March 21, 2006 
letter, in which their attorney writes of an extension of time to answer the Second 
Amended Complaint (R. at 1529); (4) Mr. Hathaway's proposal of, and the scheduling of 
appointments to interview, two business appraisers; (5) Amber's filing of her Second 
Amended Complaint to include her claim for a declaration that she owns 1/3 of HBE (R. 
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at 560-75); (6) the joint retention of, and payment to, a business appraiser in 2007 by 
Amber's current counsel and the Hamilton's counsel; and (7) the Hamiltons' alleged 
"dismissal of] their counterclaims." (Hamiltons' Brf. at 28-29.) None of that supports 
the existence, as a matter of law, of the alleged partial settlement agreement.6 
1. The February 24, 2006 Letter From The Hamiltons' Attorney Is 
Inadmissible Hearsay. 
The February 24, 2006 letter from the Hamilton's attorney, Mark Morris, is 
unavailing to the Hamiltons because it contains inadmissible hearsay. The letter asserts 
that Amber's lawyer made a settlement proposal "a couple of weeks ago." (R. at 1536-
37.) This portion of the letter is an out-of-court statement by the Hamiltons' agent, not 
Amber's, "offered in evidence [by the Hamiltons] to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted," so it is inadmissible hearsay. Utah R. Evid. 801(c), 802. 
The Hamiltons argue that the letter's contents are admissible because "[s]imilar 
evidence has been considered in other cases," and the letter's contents were not offered 
for the truth, but were instead "verbal acts." (Hamilton's Brf. at 30-31.) The Hamiltons, 
however, cite no authority for the proposition that hearsay otherwise inadmissible may 
nevertheless be considered to determine whether a settlement agreement was reached. 
Indeed, the case they cite in support of their argument that "[s]imilar evidence has been 
6
 In addition, the Hamiltons seem to argue that the District Court's holding, as a 
matter of law, that the parties entered into a settlement agreement is reviewed under the 
abuse of discretion standard. (Hamiltons' Brf. at 27.) As the Hamiltons concede earlier 
in their brief, however, "'[WJhether a contract exists between parties is a question of law 
which we review for correctness.'" (IdL at 3 (quoting John Deere Co. v. A & H Equip., 
Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)).) 
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considered in other cases" - John Deere Co. v. A&H Equipment, Inc., 876 P.2d 880 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) - provides that the existence of settlement agreements depends on 
the same principles affecting the existence of other types of contracts. Id. at 883; see also 
Utah R. Evid. 101, 1101(a) (identifying proceedings in which rules of evidence are 
applicable). Moreover, no hearsay objection was lodged in John Deere Co., so the Court 
did not address the admissibility of any of the letters brought to its attention.7 
Contrary to the Hamiltons' brief, the portion of Mr. Morris' February 24, 2006 
letter asserting a settlement proposal by Amber's lawyer was indeed offered for the truth 
of the matter asserted, so it cannot be a "verbal act." In that letter, Mr. Morris states that 
Mr. Hathaway made a settlement proposal to Mr. Morris. (R. at 1536-37.) That 
statement is clearly offered for the truth of the matter asserted - that Mr. Hathaway made 
a settlement proposal to Mr. Morris. If it was not offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted, as the Hamiltons argue, then the Hamiltons have no evidence to prove that an 
7
 The Hamiltons contend that John Deere Co. is similar to this case. It is very 
different. Not only was there no admissibility issue with regard to the evidence of offer 
and acceptance in John Deere Co., but there also was no dispute that there was an offer 
and acceptance, only whether the terms offered and accepted were sufficiently clear to 
support a meeting of the minds. 876 P.2d at 882, 883-84 ("Of the elements required to 
constitute a binding contract, A&H asserts that only one was missing - a meeting of the 
minds."). The Court held that such terms - "a mutual dismissal with prejudice and a 
general release of claims with each party to bear their respective costs and fees" - were 
sufficiently clear to establish a meeting of the minds. Id at 884-86. 
In this case, in addition to the inadmissibility of the Hamiltons' sole evidence 
of an offer and acceptance, the negotiations shifted and essential terms were added and 
subtracted as time passed, including the initial inclusion and later omission of a term that 
the appraisal would be "binding" for any buyout "that would follow from the judicial 
determination of Amber's [HBE] ownership." (R. at 1516-27, 1529, 1559-60 (emphasis 
added).) 
#250002 vl sic 
13 
offer was made, which is an essential element necessary to find the existence of a 
contract. Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, ^ 14, 20 P.3d 388. They presented 
no independent evidence of an alleged settlement offer that they accepted. 
This case is similar to Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 2008 UT 
o 
App. 405, in which the plaintiffs attempted to prove the existence of a settlement 
agreement. In that case, one of the plaintiffs testified, through an affidavit, that a 
mediator told her that the defendants had accepted her settlement offer. The defendants 
objected on hearsay grounds, and, like the Hamiltons in this case, the plaintiffs replied 
that the defendants' acceptance was a "verbal act" that was not offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted. The District Court overruled the hearsay exception, and this Court 
reversed: 
the claim for breach of oral settlement agreement here is premised upon the 
truth of the mediator's statements regarding Defendants' acceptance or 
rejection of [plaintiffs'] settlement offer. One cannot prove a breach of 
contract claim without proving the actual existence of a contract, including 
offer and acceptance. See Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, % 14, 
20 P.3d 388. . . . Thus, . . . the trial court in the instant case exceeded its 
discretion by admitting the hearsay in [the plaintiffs] affidavit. 
We would reach the same result even if Defendants' purported statement 
accepting [the plaintiffs'] settlement offer were considered nonhearsay 
under the verbal acts doctrine. Under this theory, the mediator's statement 
conveying that acceptance would need to fit an exception to the hearsay 
rule or be construed as nonhearsay to be admissible for purposes of proving 
a breach of contract claim. Contrary to Plaintiffs' contention, the 
mediator's statement does not qualify as a nonhearsay parly-opponent 
admission relayed by a duly-authorized agent. A mediator, by definition, is 
not an agent [of the defendants] . . . . 
Moss was decided on November 6, 2008, after Amber filed her opening brief in 
this appeal. 
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Id 11117-18 (citations omitted).9 
Likewise, in this case, the alleged existence of a partial settlement agreement is 
premised upon the truth of Mr. Morris' statement in his letter regarding Mr. Hathaway's 
having made a proposal. The Hamiltons cannot enforce a settlement agreement without 
proving the actual existence of a contract, including the offer. Thus, Mr. Morris' out-of-
court, unsworn statement in his February 24, 2006 letter that Mr. Hathaway made a 
settlement offer is inadmissible hearsay. 
The same is true even if Mr. Hathaway's purported statement making a settlement 
offer were considered nonhearsay under the verbal acts doctrine. Under that theory, Mr. 
Morris' restatement of that alleged offer would need to fit an exception to the hearsay 
rule or be construed as nonhearsay to be admissible for purposes of proving the alleged 
settlement agreement. The Hamiltons do not attempt to identify any hearsay exception or 
reason to construe Mr. Morris' letter as nonhearsay. As in Moss, Mr. Morris' letter does 
not qualify as an admission by a party-opponent because the letter was offered by the 
Hamiltons and was authored by their agent, not Amber's. "Obviously, a prior statement 
9
 Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has squarely held that out-of-court statements 
alleging that offers were made are not excepted from the hearsay rule simply because 
they deal with offers. Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1036 (Utah 1984) 
(excluding evidence of offers to purchase as "clearly hearsay"); Durfey v. Board of Ed. of 
Wayne Co. Sch. Dist, 604 P.2d 480, 484-85 (Utah 1979) (testimony of defendant's 
employee that he made a job offer to plaintiff was not hearsay "[s]ince the evidence in 
this instance was offered not as proof of an employment offer, but only to show good 
faith"). 
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of a party offered by that party is not an admission of a party-opponent." M. Graham, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 7015 (Interim ed. 2000) (see cases cited in 
n.2.). 
2. Mr. Hathaway's Failure To Deny Making His Alleged Offer Is No 
Evidence Of The Alleged Offer. 
The Hamiltons contend that Mr. Hathaway's failure to respond to Mr. Morris' 
February 24, 2006 letter by denying having made an offer proves that Mr. Hathaway 
made it. The authorities, however, overwhelmingly hold that "[s]ilence alone does not 
give consent, even by estoppel. . . ." 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 41.e. (1963); Restatement 
(Second) Contracts § 69 cmt. a (1981) (same). To prove an offer, the Hamiltons were 
required to present admissible evidence of a '"manifestation of willingness to enter into 
a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to the 
bargain is invited and will conclude it.'" 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Weigner, 2005 UT App. 
523, ^ 2 , 127 P.3d 1241 (emphasis added) (quoting Engineering Assocs. v. Irving Place 
Assocs., 622 P.2d 784, 787 (Utah 1980)). Mr. Hathaway's silence was no manifestation 
of a willingness to enter into a contract as set forth in Mr. Morris' February 24, 2006 
letter, as Mr. Hathaway testified in his affidavit.11 (R. at 1559-60.) 
10
 The District Court erred, not only by relying on Mr. Moms' inadmissible 
February 24, 2006 letter, but also by refusing to look beyond the letter to determine 
whether the parties had a meeting of the minds on the terms of a settlement agreement. 
This is contrary to controlling case law, which requires Utah courts to consider "all" 
related communications. Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 1000, f 22, 
989 P.2d 1077. 
11
 The Hamiltons challenge the veracity of Mr. Hathaway's affidavit, particularly 
his testimony that he and Amber would never have offered or accepted a settlement 
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3. Mr. Morris' March 21, 2006 Letter Also Is Inadmissible Hearsay, 
Which Actually Refutes The Existence Of A Settlement Agreement. 
The Hamiltons rely on a March 21, 2006 letter, again from Mr. Morris to Mr. 
Hathaway. (Hamiltons' Brf. at 15; R. at 1529.) This letter contains inadmissible hearsay, 
just like Mr. Morris' February 24, 2006 letter. Assuming it is admissible, the letter 
supports Amber's argument that the parties intended to defer any enforceable obligations 
until a writing was prepared and signed: 
we have reached an agreement in principle that most of the claims set forth 
[in the Second Amended Complaint] are going to be effectively dismissed 
and released when our clients enter into an agreement. . . . 
(R. at 1529 (emphasis added).) In addition, the letter confirmed Mr. Hathaway's 
understanding that the joint appraisal of HBE "will be binding" on any buyout that 
"would follow from judicial determination of Amber's ownership." (Id (emphasis 
added); R. at 1559-60.) The alleged settlement agreement that the Hamiltons advanced, 
and the District Court found, omitted that essential term. 
4. The "Conduct" That The Hamiltons Allege Does Not Prove, As A 
Matter Of Law, The Existence Of A Settlement Agreement. 
The Hamiltons advance certain "conduct" as evidence of the alleged settlement 
agreement. First, the Hamiltons point to Mr. Hathaway's suggestion of, and the 
scheduled appointments with, two business appraisers. The Hamiltons, however, fail to 
agreement without a buy-out provision. (Hamiltons' Brf. at 28 n.20.) The Hamiltons 
argue that Amber's actions "belie this assertion" because she "did share the costs of the 
business valuation expert without any agreement that a buyout would follow." Id. 
Amber's agreement to pay half of the appraiser's fee belies nothing. Her agreement to 
pay appraiser fees was not part of a settlement agreement releasing any of her claims. 
Thus, Mr. Hathaway's testimony is fully consistent with Amber's agreement to share the 
costs of an appraiser. 
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explain why such conduct is not at least as consistent with the notion that the parties' 
settlement negotiations failed to result in a contract. The Hamiltons' evidence also shows 
that the parties in 2006 did not take the next step in the process - actually interviewing 
and retaining an appraiser. The refusal to take that step is indicative of a failure to reach 
a settlement agreement that includes, as one of its terms, the joint retention of an 
appraiser. 
Second, the Hamiltons suggest that Amber's filing of her Second Amended 
Complaint on March 20, 2006, supports the existence of the alleged partial settlement 
agreement because it included Amber's claim for a declaration as to the parties' 
respective ownership of HBE. (Hamiltons' Brf. at 15, 29; R. at 560-75.) What the 
Hamiltons fail to mention, however, is that Amber's Second Amended Complaint also 
included all the claims that the Hamiltons argue Amber released through the alleged 
settlement agreement. (R. at 565-69.) Further, Amber moved for leave to file her Second 
Amended Complaint on December 1, 2005, well before any alleged settlement 
negotiations. (R. at 398-423.) In fact, the Hamiltons opposed Amber's motion to amend. 
(R. at 431-88.) Thus, Amber's Second Amended Complaint was not filed as part of any 
alleged settlement agreement. 
Finally, the Hamiltons argue that the parties' joint retention of an appraiser in 
2007, and the Hamiltons' "dismissal]" of their counterclaims, support the existence of 
the alleged settlement agreement. Amber rebutted those contentions in her opening brief 
with evidence and argument to which the Hamiltons fail to respond. (Amber's Brf. at 21-
22.) Furthermore, the Hamiltons did not actually effectuate a dismissal of their 
18 
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counterclaims. Under Utah R. Civ. P. 41(c), the Hamiltons needed a court order to 
dismiss their counterclaims because Amber had already filed a responsive pleading. (R. 
at 341-46.) No court order dismissing the Hamiltons' counterclaims was entered. Thus, 
the Hamiltons did not, in fact, dismiss their counterclaims. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN PRECLUDING AMBER FROM 
PRESENTING HER EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT OF THE 
HAMILTONS' FRAUDULENT PROCUREMENT OF THE FFCL AND 
THE ORDER. 
The District Court precluded Amber from presenting her fraudulent procurement 
evidence and argument because it was absent from her pleadings, but controlling case law 
holds that a plaintiff is not precluded from asserting responses to the defendant's 
affirmative defenses, even if such responses are absent from the plaintiffs pleadings. 
Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 313-14, 283 P.2d 884, 886 (Utah 1955); see also FDIC 
v. First Nafl Finance Co., 587 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 1978). 
Nothing in the Hamiltons' brief supports the District Court's ruling. On the 
contrary, the Hamiltons cite more authority for the proposition that plaintiffs need not 
plead their responses to affirmative defenses, even if such responses should otherwise be 
The Hamiltons contend that the conduct they describe makes this case like 
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending System, Inc., 866 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). This 
case is almost nothing like Goodmansen, in which both sides' lawyers signed, not one, 
but two letters setting forth the terms of the parties' settlement. IdL at 582-83. In 
addition, the act in Goodmansen consistent with a settlement having been reached was 
the cancellation of the scheduled trial. Id at 585. In this case, the Hamiltons presented 
no document signed by representatives of both sides or evidence of an act like the 
cancellation of a trial. On the contrary, the record indicates that litigation activity related 
to the claims Amber allegedly released continued after the parties purportedly reached a 
settlement agreement. (R. at 553-54, 558-59, 560-75, 1389-90.) 
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affirmatively alleged. Specifically, the Hamiltons cite Thomas v. Heirs of Braffet 6 Utah 
2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 (Utah 1956) (Hamiltons' Brf. at 36), which applied and expanded 
Hansen v. Morris. Id. at 63-64, 305 P.2d at 511-12. Thomas adopted the "general rule of 
law" that plaintiffs are entitled to prove grounds for avoidance of defenses even if those 
grounds are absent from their pleadings: 
The Utah Rules provide that no responsive pleading shall be allowed to a[n 
answer], and it is a general rule of law that where no responsive 
pleading is required, the party is entitled to prove further matters of 
avoidance. 
Id. at 63-64, 305 P.2d at 512 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
In their Fourteenth Defense, the Hamiltons asserted the affirmative defense of 
authorization to Amber's Fifth Claim for PLelief to be declared a 1/3 owner ofHBE.13 (R. 
at 1369.) Amber was not allowed to file a reply to the Hamiltons' answer. (R. at 1905.) 
Thus, under Hansen v. Morris and Thomas v. Heirs of Braffet, Amber "is entitled to 
The Hamiltons' Fourteenth Defense clearly "constitutes] an avoidance," on 
which the Hamiltons bear the burden of proof. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c). 
[I]f a confidential relationship is found to exist between parties, any 
transaction that benefits the party in whom trust is reposed is presumed to 
have been unfair and to have resulted from undue influence and fraud. The 
benefiting party then bears the burden of persuading the fact finder by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the transaction was in fact fair and not 
the result of fraud or undue influence. If that burden is not carried, the 
transaction will be set aside. 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted). In this case, 
the Hamiltons had the burden of proving that their receipt of 8,317 HBE shares was not 
the result of undue influence, and their current theory is that their receipt of 8,317 was 
authorized by the FFCL and the Order. Amber's response to that theory is, in part, that if 
the FFCL and the Order authorized the Hamiltons to take 8,317 HBE shares, the FFCL 
and the Order were procured by fraud, which nullifies such authorization. Pepper v. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 801 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1990). 
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prove further matters of avoidance" to "knock out [the Hamiltons'] defense," as the 
Hamiltons admitted below.14 (R. at 1717, 1719, 1722.) Thomas, 6 Utah 2d at 63, 305 
P.2d at 512; Hansen, 3 Utah 2d at 314, 283 P.2d at 886. 
Aside from providing further support for Amber's position, the Hamiltons argue: 
(1) this Court need not reach the issue unless it reverses the dismissal of one of Amber's 
affirmative claims; (2) Amber's fraudulent procurement theory was an "affirmative 
claim" that Amber should have pled much earlier; and (3) the applicable standard of 
review is the abuse of discretion standard. These arguments lack merit. 
1. This Court Should Address The District Court's Denial Of Amber's 
Motion In Limine Because Such Denial Was Part Why The District 
Court Dismissed Amber's Claim To Be Declared A 1/3 Owner Of HBE. 
The Hamiltons argue that unless this Court reverses the District Court's dismissal 
of Amber's claim to be declared a 1/3 owner of HBE, it need not reach the issue of 
whether the District Court erred in precluding Amber from presenting her fraudulent 
procurement theory. This Court, however, should reverse that dismissal, not only 
The Hamiltons admit that "[they] agreed that [Amber] did not need to file a 
pleading to raise fraud as a defense to the Hamilton brothers' affirmative defenses." 
(Hamiltons' Brf at 17.) They go on to say, however, that they "never agreed that, after 
the grant of summary judgment, [Amber] could affirmatively reassert these new grounds 
to collaterally attack the validity of the 1994 FFCL." (Id at 17.) Their latter statement is 
belied by the record. The District Court granted the Hamiltons partial summary judgment 
in its March 27, 2006 ruling. (R. at 1378-86.) On April 13, 2007, Amber's counsel e-
mailed Mr. Morris "to try to get [his] agreement" that Amber did not have to incorporate 
her fraudulent procurement theory into her pleadings to continue to assert it. (R. at 
1719.) On the same day, Mr. Morris replied, "I think you're right." (R. at 1719.) Four 
days later, the parties' counsel had a telephone conversation in which Mr. Morris agreed 
that Amber could continue to assert her response to the Hamiltons' Fourteenth Defense, 
even though such response consists, in part, of averments of fraud absent from Amber's 
pleadings. (R. at 1717, 1722.) 
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because the District Court erred in holding that the FFCL and the Order authorized them 
to take 8,317 HBE shares, but also because the District Court erred in precluding Amber 
from presenting one of her responses to the Hamiltons' authorization defense - that if the 
FFCL and the Order authorized the Hamiltons to take $699,459.70 of HBE stock, those 
rulings were procured by fraud. 
Amber asserted two, independent responses to the Hamiltons' Fourteenth Defense: 
(1) the FFCL and the Order did not authorize the Hamiltons to take more HBE shares 
than Amber received; and (2) if they did, the Hamiltons procured the FFCL and the Order 
through their fraudulent misrepresentation that their distributions would equal only 
$99,840 each. (R. at 918, 1109-14, 1102-04.) The District Court rejected Amber's first 
response with its March 27, 2007 Ruling (R. at 1378-86), which was followed-up with an 
April 16, 2007 Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. at 1391-93.) 
In neither expression of the District Court's ruling did the District Court decide Amber's 
second response, and it did not then dismiss Amber's claim to be declared 1/3 owner of 
HBE. 
The District Court did not reach Amber's second response until it denied Amber's 
Motion in Limine Regarding Evidence and Argument Responsive to Defendants' 
Affirmative Defenses, and, If Necessary, Motion for Order to File Reply to Answer. (R. 
at 1674-99.) Thus, the issue of whether Amber should have been allowed to present her 
fraudulent procurement argument to overcome the Hamiltons' Fourteenth Defense must 
be part of this Court's review of the District Court's dismissal of Amber's claim to be 
declared 1/3 owner of HBE. 
22 
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Amber's Fraudulent Procurement Theory Was Not An "Affirmative 
Claim/' And She Asserted It In As Timely A Manner As Necessary. 
procurement theory from her pleadings is because, until she filed her Second Amended 
Complaint on March 20, 2006, there was no claim for relief in this case to which such 
lllieon related. Il lit iiinl«s|iulul dispuMhu1 lin I nl lln III.III* i is lliat In ton A ml M I IIIMI 
her Second Amended Complaint on March 20, 2006, neither sides' pleadings included a 
claim for relief that required a determination of how many HBE shares each party owned. 
although the Hamiltons had asserted that they received their shares through the FFCL and 
the Order prior to March 20, 2006, those assertions were unrelated to ;mv claim for relief, 
CI IK'III III '"'HI \ . 
heightened burden of persuasion and elements of proof associated with ii. And when 
Amber did plead her claim to be declared a 1/3 shareholder in her Second Amended 
1
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the Hamiltons subsequently pled as their Fourteenth Defense in their February 2 •- JU / 
answer,16 (R. at 1367-75.) Thus, Amber was not required to assert her fraudulent 
er. 
15
 Thomas, 6 IJtnh M , . , II. 
Another reason Amber should not have been required to anticipate that defense 
is that the Hamiltons disclaimed it in their previous deposition testimony. (R. at 1012-14, 
1016, 1052-58.) 
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3. The Applicable Standard Of Review Is The Correction Of Error 
Standard. 
The Hamiltons argue that the applicable standard of review is the abuse of 
discretion standard because the issue was "whether or not to admit evidence." 
(Hamiltons' Brf. at 4.) The issue, however, dealt not with the admissibility of evidence 
under evidentiary rules, but rather with the construction of pleadings and rules regarding 
pleadings. On such matters, the correction of error standard applies. Ostler v. Buhler, 
1999 UT 99, H 5, 989 P.2d 1073; Board of Ed. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 
659 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah 1983); Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 
(Utah 1977); Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 829 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
In addition, this Court has held that "'[t]he appropriate standard of review of a trial 
court's decision admitting or excluding evidence . . . depends on the particular ruling in 
dispute,'" and "where a trial court's ruling implicates legal questions, . . . we review [the 
determination] for correctness.'" Moss, 2008 UT App. 405, ^ [ 11 (latter two alterations in 
original) (quoting TWN, Inc. v. Michel 2006 UT App. 70, ^ 9, 131 P.3d 882) (quoting 
Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 978 (Utah 1993)). The District Court's decision to 
preclude Amber's fraudulent procurement theory "implicates legal questions" - the 
dismissal as a matter of law of Amber's claim to be declared 1/3 owner of HBE, so it 
should be reviewed for correctness. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in Amber's two appellate briefs, this Court should reverse 
lln Distiii I ( 'mill . ilraiiissiil us ,i Hindu nl l,nv nl \inhi i '. i hums. 
DATED this 23rd day of December, 2008. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Christopher R. Hogle 
Richard D. Flint 
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